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The mathematician is only strong and true as long as he is logical, and if  
number rules the world, it is logic which rules number.
—William Stanley Jevons, Principles of Science (1874).
1  Mathematical Axioms and the Logocentric 
Predicament
Bertrand Russell’s approach in Principia Mathematica and elsewhere 
often is taken as definitive of logicism, or even of “Frege-Russell logi-
cism.” According to the logicist approach, mathematics can be (and 
ought to be) derived from logic, using inferences governed by logical 
laws. With Frege, Russell distinguished logical laws from the laws of 
thought and from psychology generally, which distinguishes logicism 
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106     L. Patton
from an earlier tradition found in Boole’s The Laws of Thought, and in 
the Kantian logicians Erdmann and Sigwart.
On a well-known reading, Russell interprets the laws of logic as uni-
versal, true, a priori conditions for the derivation of the results of logic 
and of mathematics. On this reading, Russell appeals to deduction from 
the laws—taken as a priori truths—as the sole ground of justification 
for inferences in logic and in mathematics. We might conclude that the 
fact that we can derive mathematical results from them deductively is a 
justification of the logical laws themselves. And we might transfer this 
axiomatic justification to the axioms of mathematics, as they are applied 
in that science. The axioms of mathematics would be for Russell a set 
of truths derived from logic, which do not stand in need of further 
justification.
From Sheffer and Wittgenstein onward, the objection has been 
made that Frege’s and Russell’s logicist methods do not even allow for 
an epistemic, scientific, or external justification for the laws of logic or, 
by extension, for the axioms of mathematics. Logic is seen as a “first 
science,” as the science that founds the others. Moreover, since logic is 
treated as a universal language of ultimate generality, there is no per-
spective from outside of logic—no meta-perspective—from which to 
evaluate the truth or the validity of the logical laws.
Frege’s and Russell’s systems are meant to provide a universal language: a 
framework inside of which all rational discourse proceeds. Thus there can 
be no position outside the system from which to assess it. The laws they 
derive are general laws with fixed sense; questions of disinterpretation 
and reinterpretation cannot arise. All this distinguishes their conception 
of logic from that more common today, which relies on schematization 
and interpretation and defines logical truth by reference to schemata. […] 
Frege and Russell can have no notion of “interpretation,” or of “seman-
tics.” The text surrounding their formulas is at best heuristic, aimed at 
initiating their audience into their languages (Goldfarb 1982, 694; cited 
in Korhonen 2012, 599).
In a review of Principia Mathematica, Harry Sheffer objected that 
the logicist project involves a circle, which he dubs the “logocentric 
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Russell’s Method of Analysis and the Axioms of Mathematics     107
predicament”: “In order to give an account of logic, we must presuppose 
and employ logic ” (1926, 228). Proving that logical statements are true 
requires proving that they are truths within logic itself, within the sys-
tems constructed by Frege and Russell. But, since logic is the univer-
sal language of rational discourse, any project of justification must stop 
there. There is no way to re-interpret the statements of logic, no meta-
language or meta-perspective within which we consider candidate log-
ical systems, for instance, and assess the basis for truth claims within 
each. An optimist might conclude that logic is its own basis, while a 
skeptic will conclude that the question of justification leads to a regress 
without resolution (see Ricketts 1985, Quine 1936/1976, Gillian 
Russell 2014, §3.1.1).
For Frege, the univocity of sense and reference of his logical proposi-
tions was a virtue, and it even extended to mathematical propositions. 
Frege carefully distinguished the laws of logic from schematic axioms 
and from rules of inference.1 In particular, the laws of logic, for Frege, 
are univocal, uninterpretable, and universal truths. Fregean logical laws 
are purely general and do not apply to, nor are they derived from, any 
particular subject matter (Blanchette 2012, 74–75, 127–128; Frege 
1884/1994, §64). Moreover, in his debates with Hilbert over the foun-
dations of geometry, Frege argued that the propositions of geometry 
were not susceptible to multiple interpretations and that the axioms of 
geometry should express univocal truths.
Russell, on the other hand, did not make Frege’s distinction between 
laws of logic and rules of inference (Ricketts 1985, 4–7 and passim ). 
Moreover, as Kremer (2006) and others have emphasized, Frege and 
Russell had distinct interpretations of analyticity and syntheticity, and 
of logical justification more generally. If Frege’s and Russell’s logicist 
positions and methods are not identical, then what kind of logicist is 
Russell?
The question is not a mere question of classification. If Russell’s logi-
cism rests on deriving results from the laws of logic, if pure mathematics 
rests on proving that statements about number rest on logical implica-
tion, and if the project of justifying the laws of logic leads to an irreso-
luble regress (the logocentric predicament), then the project stumbles.2
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108     L. Patton
Recent scholarship has emphasized another argumentative ten-
dency in Russell, one that departs from Frege’s methods. Irvine (2009), 
Godwyn and Irvine (2003), Hager (2003), and Gandon (2012) have 
urged that historians of philosophy take into account Russell’s method 
of analysis and his regressive method for justifying the axioms of logic.
Firstly, philosophical analysis proceeds backward from a body of knowl-
edge to its premisses, and, secondly, it proceeds forward from the prem-
isses to a reconstruction of the original body of knowledge (Hager 2003, 
310).
Russell refers to the first, “analytic” step as “regressive.”3 The second, 
“synthetic” step is deductive: re-deriving the original body of knowledge 
from the premisses arrived at through analysis. The body of “knowl-
edge” can be a set of observations or intuitive “truths of perception,” 
or it can be demonstrative knowledge in mathematics or empirical sci-
ence.4 The aim of the method of analysis is to derive the necessary con-
ditions for the results under investigation and then to show that the 
results follow from the conditions.
The essay following traces some of the historical roots of, and moti-
vations for, Russell’s method, which in turn shed light on his view 
about the status of mathematical axioms. In the early 1900s, Russell 
began to recognize that he, and many other mathematicians, had been 
using assertions like the Axiom of Choice implicitly, and without 
explicitly proving them (see Moore 2015, lv). In working with his and 
Whitehead’s Multiplicative Axiom, often considered to be equivalent to 
the Axiom of Choice, Russell came to take the position that some axi-
oms are necessary to recovering certain results of mathematics, but may 
not be proven to be true absolutely.
Russell came to the position that, in the case of at least some math-
ematical axioms, our commitment to them as axioms need not require 
us to believe that they are true. This may seem un-logicist: should not 
the axioms be derivable from logical truths? But there is another way to 
think of the logicist method. It is possible to be a logicist, to consider 
that arithmetic is derivable from the Peano axioms, and nonetheless to 
argue that some mathematical axioms need not be universal, univocal 
a priori truths, but can have a regressive justification derived from the 
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Russell’s Method of Analysis and the Axioms of Mathematics     109
method of analysis. To a Russellian logicist, the results of mathematics 
can constitute evidence of a deeper set of logical relationships, and the 
clarification of these logical relationships can extend our knowledge, in 
mathematics and in logic.
Irvine (1989) summarizes the usual reading of Russell, according to 
which he is committed to “epistemic logicism”:
According to this view, since we are epistemically justified in accepting 
the self-evident truths of logic, the successful identification of mathemat-
ics with logic would give us the same justification for accepting the truths 
of mathematics (p. 307).
Irvine emphasized that Russell’s 1907 talk given at Cambridge, “The 
Regressive Method of Discovering the Premises of Mathematics,” as well 
as remarks he made earlier about the paradoxes, cuts against an epis-
temic logicist reading of Russell:
It was with the discovery of the contradiction [in 1901] that his self-
acclaimed “intellectual honeymoon” ended.. The following comment is 
representative and telling: “I wrote to Frege about it [the paradox] who 
replied that arithmetic was tottering and that he saw that his Law V 
was false…. For my part, I felt that the trouble lay in logic rather than 
in mathematics and that it was logic which would have to be reformed.” 
In the end it would be that parts of logic were to be epistemologically 
justified as a result of their mathematical consequences… a distinction 
between logical and epistemological order within mathematics would 
emphasize, not only the role of the regressive method, but also the close 
analogy that Russell saw between the epistemology of mathematics and 
that of the natural sciences.5
Irvine thus argues that Russell adopts a broader definition of epistemic 
justification, where logic is not the sole source of such justification. The 
question remains of how we are to understand Russell’s method of anal-
ysis, if it is not in the service of epistemic logicism. In other words, if 
“parts of logic” are to be justified “as a result of their mathematical con-
sequences,” then how are we to understand the process of analysis and of 
justification? Beaney (2003) separates three modes of analysis in Russell 
(and in Frege): regressive, resolutive, and interpretive (154 and passim ).
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110     L. Patton
We might put Irvine’s and Beaney’s readings in a broader context and 
argue that Russell was committed to something one could call imma-
nent logicism. The logicism in immanent logicism is a commitment to 
the view that analysis of logical structures within mathematics can lead 
to an expansion of knowledge.
Section 2 cites an historical precedent for Russell’s immanent logi-
cism. The early logicist William Stanley Jevons, who was cited by Frege 
and known by Russell, took a similar view of logic and method, and of 
the status of the axioms of science.
Section 3 extends this precedent into the logicism of Russell and 
even of Frege, and shows that this broader, immanent version of logi-
cism was a position available to, and considered by, both. Here I offer a 
reading of Russell’s 1907 talk in Cambridge on the regressive method, 
and investigate how immanent logicism and the regressive method were 
valuable to Russell when he was evaluating the role and use of math-
ematical axioms (the Axiom of Choice, the Multiplicative Axiom, the 
Axiom of Reducibility, and others)—in the early 1900s, on the road to 
Principia.
2  Early Logicism and the Methods of Science: 
Jevons and Venn
William Stanley Jevons’s (1874) The Principles of Science and John 
Venn’s (1866) The Logic of Chance and (1889) The Principles of Empirical 
or Inductive Logic had an impact on philosophy and on science still to 
be measured. Margaret Schabas (1984, 1990) has done significant work 
on Jevons’s place in the history of economics and of Victorian science. 
Laudan (1968) notes Jevons’s and Venn’s significance:
Jevons in particular seems to have effected a significant change in the con-
ception of many of the problems of the philosophy of science…it would 
probably be true to say that modern research into confirmation theory owes 
its greatest debt to Jevons, who argued that the essence of inductive inference 
consists in the inverse application of the classical theory of probability (35).
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What Jevons refers to as “inductive inference” is directly analogous to 
the first step of Russell’s “method of analysis,” according to which,
Firstly, philosophical analysis proceeds backwards from a body of knowl-
edge to its premisses, and, secondly, it proceeds forwards from the premisses 
to a reconstruction of the original body of knowledge (Hager 2003, 310).
Jevons deals with both processes in Principles of Science:
In deduction we are engaged in developing the consequences of a law. 
We learn the meaning, contents, results or inferences, which attach to 
any given proposition. Induction is the exactly inverse process. Given 
certain results or consequences, we are required to discover the general 
law from which they flow [….] all reasoning is founded on the princi-
ples of deduction […] I shall endeavour to show that induction is really 
the reverse process of deduction. There is no mode of ascertaining the laws 
which are obeyed in certain phenomena, unless we have the power of 
determining what results would follow from a given law (Jevons 1874, 
11–12).
In Book 2, Chapter 11, “The Philosophy of Inductive Inference,” Jevons 
explains what he means by induction as the “inversion of deduction.” 
Jevons proposes a method of inference that is an interesting hybrid of 
Herschel and Whewell:
I hold that in all cases of inductive inference we must invent hypoth-
eses, until we fall upon some hypothesis which yields deductive results in 
accordance with experience. Such accordance renders the chosen hypoth-
esis more or less probable, and we may then deduce, with some degree of 
likelihood, the nature of our future experience, on the assumption that no 
arbitrary change takes place in the conditions of nature (Jevons 1874, 228).
Calling the invention of hypotheses “induction” is owed to Whewell, 
the hypothesis “which yields deductive results in accordance with experi-
ence” to Herschel.6 But the following account that the result is to deduce 
“our future experience” “with some degree of likelihood” is Jevons’s.
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112     L. Patton
In all cases, Jevons argues that the process is the same:
Being in possession of certain particular facts or events expressed in propo-
sitions, we imagine some more general proposition expressing the existence 
of a law or cause; and, deducing the particular results of that supposed 
general proposition, we observe whether they agree with the facts in ques-
tion. Hypothesis is thus always employed, consciously or unconsciously. 
The sole conditions to which we need conform in framing any hypothesis 
is, that we both have and exercise the power of inferring deductively from 
the hypothesis to the particular results, which are to be compared with the 
known facts. Thus there are but three steps in the process of induction:
(1) Framing some hypothesis as to the character of the general law.
(2) Deducing consequences from that law.
(3) Observing whether the consequences agree with the particular facts 
under observation (Jevons 1874, 265–266).
The following features of Jevons’s account should be borne in mind:
J1.  The account of approximation, with particular reference to Boyle’s 
law and the law of gravitation, and the argument that a proof 
or demonstration of an approximate law must prove it approxi-
mately, not exactly true—that “perfect correspondence … should 
give rise to suspicion” (1874, 457).
J2.  The account of inverse induction, as inferring laws from observed 
facts, including mathematical facts, and then testing the conse-
quences of those laws against the facts.
J3.  The law of gravitation as having more consequences than the phenom-
ena of gravitation (laws as sources of fruitfulness); Jevons (1874), 259.
J4.  The argument that the axioms of logic and mathematics, like the 
laws of physical sciences, are only probably true, but that the joint 
probability of those axioms, given all the other observed facts that 
can be derived from them, approaches certainty.
As will become clear in the section following, versions of all four claims 
can be found in Russell’s talk in Cambridge, “The Regressive Method 
of Discovering the Axioms of Mathematics” (1907/1973). For my pur-
poses, it is not crucial that any of these ideas came from Jevons. The 
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point is that there were precedents for Russell’s method of analysis, 
and even for some elements of what I’ve called his immanent logicism. 
Russell could be expected to be aware of these precedents and to have 
taken their proponents seriously.
3  Russell’s Regressive Method and Immanent 
Logicism
Jevons’s and Venn’s methods of induction and deduction are not new. 
They are very similar to the Greek methods of analysis and synthesis 
in geometry, discussed by Proclus in his commentary on Euclid, for 
instance. Nonetheless, it is of interest that there was a renewed focus 
on the regressive justification of mathematical axioms just before Russell 
began working in the early twentieth century. Russell’s method of analy-
sis, which uses regressive or abductive inference to rise from the facts or 
results to principles or axioms and then derives the facts or results from 
those principles or axioms, is in this vein.7
Russell begins his talk, “The Regressive Method of Discovering the 
Principles of Mathematics,” read to the Cambridge Mathematical Club 
on March 9, 1907, with the following remark:
My object in this paper is to explain in what sense a comparatively 
obscure and difficult proposition may be said to be a premise for a com-
paratively obvious proposition, to consider how premises in this sense 
may be discovered, and to emphasise the close analogy between the meth-
ods of pure mathematics and the methods of the sciences of observation 
(Russell 1907/1973, 272).
The axioms and rules of logic, Russell points out, are more complicated 
than their relatively simple arithmetical consequences:
There is an apparent absurdity in proceeding, as one does in the logical 
theory of arithmetic, through many rather recondite propositions of sym-
bolic logic, to the “proof” of such truisms as 2 + 2 = 4: for it is plain that 
the conclusion is more certain than the premises, and the supposed proof 
therefore seems futile. But of course what we are really proving is not the 
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114     L. Patton
truth of 2 + 2 = 4, but the fact that from our premises this truth can be 
deduced (Russell 1907/1973, 272).
Since Russell uses the word “deduced,” it may appear that he is describ-
ing a purely deductive process, of deriving 2 + 2 = 4 from logical prem-
ises. But this is not the case, as Russell goes on to say.
in mathematics, except in the earliest parts, the propositions from which 
a given proposition is deduced generally give the reason why we believe 
the given proposition. But in dealing with the principles of mathematics, 
this relation is reversed. Our propositions are too simple to be easy, and 
thus their consequences are generally easier than they are. Hence we tend 
to believe the premises because we can see that their consequences are 
true, instead of believing the consequences because we know the prem-
ises to be true. But the inferring of premises from consequences is the 
essence of induction; thus the method in investigating the principles of 
mathematics is really an inductive method, and is substantially the same 
as the method of discovering general laws in any other science (Russell 
1907/1973, 273–274).
Russell uses the law of gravitation as an example of a physical law that 
is comparable to logical laws, because it “leads to many consequences 
which could not be discovered merely from the apparent motions of the 
heavenly bodies” (275). Logical laws, similarly, allow for the discovery 
of mathematical consequences not discoverable without them, includ-
ing Peano’s axioms and Frege’s definition of number:
Peano prefaces his arithmetic by an exposition of symbolic logic; and sym-
bolic logic is used by him in deducing arithmetic from his five premises. 
Thus the premises of symbolic logic are in any case necessary to arithmetic; 
if they can be shown to be also sufficient, the five premises will cease to 
be logical premises, and will take their place as theorems. The first serious 
attempt in this direction is that of Frege, who showed that a cardinal num-
ber may be defined as a class of similar classes (Russell 1907/1973, 277).
The necessity and sufficiency of these premises for arithmetic are not 
assessed piecemeal. Rather, the probability of the axioms is determined 
jointly, as they function as a system:
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Assuming the usual laws of deduction, two obvious propositions of which 
one can be deduced from the other both become more nearly certain than 
they would be in isolation; and thus in a complicated deductive system, 
many parts of which are obvious, the total probability may become all 
but absolute certainty. Thus although intrinsic obviousness is the basis of 
every science, it is never, in a fairly advanced science, the whole of our 
reason for believing any one proposition of the science (279).
Nonetheless, if a paradox or contradiction is found in the axiomatic 
system, Russell argues, then it is important to isolate which of the axi-
oms is responsible for the contradiction and to isolate the consequences 
of that axiom or axioms from the others. This requires an “experimen-
tal” method, since there is no certain way to assess a priori whether 
an axiom leads to false conclusions. Moreover, we must show that the 
axiom, or “logical premise,” leads correctly to the conclusions claimed 
for it, and that any modification of the system approaches more closely 
to a secure derivation:
All this is very like the procedure of other sciences. Boyle’s law, e.g. is only 
approximately true; therefore our premises must both prove it approxi-
mately true, and not prove it quite true. Thus Frege’s premises undoubt-
edly give a first approximation, and the exact truth must be very like 
them (p. 280).
Russell is committed, then, to the following four claims:
R1.  A law, such as Boyle’s law, that is only approximately true should 
not be treated in scientific reasoning as exactly true or as abso-
lutely certain, but rather as approaching the truth (or the phe-
nomena) to a given, specific degree of accuracy; Frege’s axioms for 
arithmetic fall into this class.
R2.  The regressive method infers laws from observed facts (conse-
quences), including mathematical facts. We may reason from 
mathematical facts (results) to logical premises, and the logical 
premises may be more complex than the mathematical facts.
R3.  Laws or axioms are sources of fruitfulness: the law of gravitation 
has more consequences than the phenomena of gravitation, and 
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116     L. Patton
the axioms of logic have more consequences than a list of specific 
results of mathematics.
R4.  The axioms of logic and mathematics, like the laws of physical 
sciences, are only probably true, but the joint probability of those 
axioms, given the observed facts or results that can be derived 
from them, approaches certainty (Russell expresses this position 
more concretely in Whitehead and Russell 1925, 59).
It is instructive to compare R1–R4 with J1–J4 in the section above. 
One could make a straightforward claim that the account of the discov-
ery and justification of axioms that Russell is working within that talk is 
Jevons’s. Russell did possess a copy of Jevons’s Principles of Science.8 And 
several of Russell’s interlocutors around this time, including Bradley, 
Keynes, and Frege, engage with Jevons’s Principles in their work.9
Still, there are alternative sources for each idea.10 J2 could have come 
to Russell through §16 of Frege’s Foundations.11 J3 is a well-known fea-
ture of Whewell’s account of induction as well as Jevons’s. A version of 
J4 can be found in Poincaré’s Science and Method.12
The historical point, though, is that the application of the “regres-
sive method” to the axioms of mathematics and of empirical science 
was broadly established by the end of the nineteenth century. When 
Russell’s “intellectual honeymoon” ended, and he realized the depth of 
the problems posed by the paradoxes and by the lack of justification for 
certain axioms, Russell conceived of a new position with respect to the 
axioms of mathematics and of the relationship between mathematics 
and logic, a position informed by these earlier discussions.
In the early 1900s, Russell became increasingly aware of the role of 
certain axioms, including the axioms of reducibility, choice, and infin-
ity, and the multiplicative axiom, in deriving the results of mathematics. 
One way of reading the title of Russell’s talk, “The Regressive Method of 
Discovering the Principles of Mathematics,” is to say that the regressive 
method helps us to discover the principles of mathematics: the single, 
fundamental, true laws of logic from which mathematics is derived. But 
another way to read the title is to say that the regressive method allows us 
to identify the principles of mathematics that were always at work in, and 
implicit in, mathematical practice. G. H. Moore (2015) puts it this way:
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The role played by the Axiom of Choice in Russell’s work is long and 
complicated. Like many mathematicians around 1900, he used the 
Axiom of Choice implicitly without realizing that he had done so, since 
no one had yet formulated it explicitly (lv).
Russell came to realize the significance of a number of proposi-
tions in the early 1900s, including the Axiom of Choice, his own and 
Whitehead’s Multiplicative Axiom, and other related statements then in 
use. In a letter to Jourdain, he writes,
As for the Xve [multiplicative] axiom, I came on it so to speak by chance. 
Whitehead and I make alternate recensions of the various parts of our 
book, each correcting the last recension made by the other. In going over 
one of his recensions, which contained a proof of the Xve axiom, I found 
that the previous prop[osition] used in the proof had surreptitiously 
assumed the axiom. This happened in the summer of 1904. At first I 
thought probably a proof could easily be found; but gradually I saw that, 
if there is a proof, it must be very recondite (Letter of March 15, 1906, 
reprinted in Grattan-Guiness 1972, 107).
In another work, Moore describes Russell’s route to the Multiplicative 
Axiom:
Russell reached the Multiplicative Axiom by a route quite different from 
Zermelo’s path to the Axiom of Choice. While Zermelo had been preoc-
cupied with the Well-Ordering Problem, Russell’s Multiplicative Axiom 
arose from considering the infinite product of disjoint sets, i.e., their mul-
tiplicative class, in order to define the product of infinitely many cardinals. 
During 1902 Whitehead, who was already collaborating with Russell, had 
defined the multiplicative class Kx of a disjoint family K of non-empty 
classes: Kx is the class of all those sub-classes M of the union of K such that 
for every S in K, M ∩ S has exactly one member. When finally published, 
Russell’s Multiplicative Axiom took the following form (1906, 49):
(2.7.1) If K is a disjoint family of non-empty classes, then Kx is 
non-empty.
… At what point did Russell come to regard (2.7.1) as an axiom? One 
must understand that when (2.7.1) resisted his attempts to prove it, he 
became increasingly skeptical of its validity. For Russell, (2.7.1) became 
Innovations in the History of Analytical Philosophy, edited by Sandra Lapointe, and Christopher Pincock, Palgrave
         Macmillan Limited, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/vt/detail.action?docID=5049865.
Created from vt on 2019-01-10 11:14:26.
C
op
yr
ig
ht
 ©
 2
01
7.
 P
al
gr
av
e 
M
ac
m
ill
an
 L
im
ite
d.
 A
ll 
rig
ht
s 
re
se
rv
ed
.
118     L. Patton
an axiom in the sense of a fundamental unproved assertion but not in the 
sense of a self-evident truth (Moore 2012, 123).
As Moore notes, at first, Russell and Whitehead saw the Multiplicative 
Axiom as a theorem. At some point, Russell came to realize that a num-
ber of results depended on the proposition and came to regard it as an 
axiom. As Russell later put it, when we reconstruct mathematics and 
logic as deductive systems, these sorts of dependency relationships 
become more evident.
When pure mathematics is organized as a deductive system…it becomes 
obvious that, if we are to believe in the truth of pure mathematics, it can-
not be solely because we believe in the truth of the set of premises. Some 
of the premises are much less obvious than some of their consequences, 
and are believed chiefly because of their consequences … With the 
empirical sciences this is evident. Electro-dynamics, for example, can be 
concentrated into Maxwell’s equations, but these equations are believed 
because of the observed truth of certain of their logical consequences 
(Russell 1924/1988, 163–164).
“Belief,” here, is not a Keynesian or Bayesian belief in the probability 
of a proposition given certain evidence.13 Rather, it is a belief that the 
axioms are jointly probable because they recover the intuitive knowl-
edge, “truths of perception,” or demonstrated results that are under 
investigation. As Russell puts it in the introduction to the Principia 
Mathematica,
The reason for accepting an axiom, as for accepting any other proposi-
tion, is always largely inductive, namely that many propositions which are 
nearly indubitable can be deduced from it, and that no equally plausi-
ble way is known by which these propositions could be true if the axiom 
were false, and nothing which is probably false can be deduced from it. If 
the axiom is apparently self-evident, that only means, practically, that it 
is nearly indubitable; for things have been thought to be self-evident and 
have yet turned out to be false. And if the axiom itself is nearly indubita-
ble, that merely adds to the inductive evidence derived from the fact that 
its consequences are nearly indubitable: it does not provide new evidence 
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of a radically different kind. Infallibility is never attainable, and therefore 
some element of doubt should always attach to every axiom and to all its 
consequences. In formal logic, the element of doubt is less than in most 
sciences, but it is not absent, as appears from the fact that the paradoxes 
followed from premisses which were not previously known to require lim-
itations (Whitehead and Russell 1925, 59).
Russell’s aim is to reconstruct mathematics as a deductive system, using 
the method of analysis. That method requires using the regressive 
method to “discover” which are the axioms of mathematics, as opposed 
to the theorems, which requires identifying the structural and logical 
relationships of dependence within a theory.
One of the best descriptions of how such relationships can be identi-
fied can be found in Frege—and in a discussion of Jevons. In §15 of 
the Foundations, Frege cites Jevons as making “A very emphatic decla-
ration in favor of the analytic nature of the laws of logic,” that “I hold 
that algebra is a highly developed logic, and number but logical discrim-
ination.”14 Just below, Frege argues that the laws of number could be 
inferred as follows:
Instead of linking our chain of deductions direct to any matter of fact, we 
can leave the fact on one side, while adopting its content in the form of a 
condition. By substituting in this way conditions for facts throughout the 
whole of a train of reasoning, we shall finally reduce it to a form in which 
a certain result is made dependent on a certain series of conditions. This truth 
would be established by thought alone … It is not impossible that the 
laws of number are of this type. This would make them analytic judg-
ments, despite the fact that they would not normally be discovered by 
thought alone; for we are concerned here not with the way in which they 
are discovered but with kind of the ground on which their proof rests … 
It would then rest with observation finally to decide whether the con-
ditions included in the laws thus established are actually fulfilled (§16, 
emphasis added).
Whether a judgment made in this way is “analytic” has to do with 
whether a judgment is derived independently of empirical facts, not 
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with whether it is an a priori, necessary truth—in fact, Frege concludes 
above that such a judgment must be checked afterward.
Frege merely suggests a “conditional” approach, following his cita-
tion of Jevons’s claim that the laws of logic are analytic. However, in the 
Preface and Introduction to the Grundgesetze, Frege argues that the laws 
of logic should be identified as immanent in the proofs of arithmetic, 
and his discussion makes reference to a hypothetical method:
The completeness in the chains of inference ensures that each axiom, each 
assumption, each hypothesis… upon which a proof is based, is brought 
to light; and so a basis is gained for judging the epistemological nature 
of the law that is proved (Frege 1893/1997, 195, translation slightly 
amended).
Frege’s endorsement of a hypothetical or axiomatic method is in the ser-
vice of the purification of logical inference, not a way of justifying the 
laws of logic themselves. Nonetheless, Frege mentions Jevons as a source 
and sketches a method for deriving mathematical or logical results from 
“a certain series of conditions” (§16, cited above).
Since Russell comes to reject epistemic logicism as a result of the par-
adoxes and his doubts of the truth of certain axioms (Irvine 1989), he 
develops a kind of immanent logicism that applies the method of anal-
ysis to the axioms of mathematics. For Russell, distinguishing axioms 
from theorems is not just a matter of tracing back lines of dependence 
via the regressive method. The regressive method is only one of Russell’s 
modes of analysis, as Beaney (2003) observes:
we may distinguish three core modes of analysis… the regressive mode, 
concerned to identify the “starting-points” (principles, premisses, causes, 
etc.) by means of which something can be “explained” or “generated”, the 
resolutive mode, concerned to identify the elements of something and the 
way they interrelate, and the interpretive mode, concerned to “translate” 
something into a particular framework (154).
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The “resolutive” mode is what is usually identified with logical analysis: 
“the decomposition of something, and in particular, a concept or prop-
osition, into its constituents, where this may also include its form or 
structure” (Beaney 2003, 155). Beaney points out that both the regres-
sive and resolutive modes presuppose the third:
Any analysis presupposes a particular framework of interpretation, and work 
is done in interpreting what we are seeking to analyse – the analysandum – 
as part of the process of disclosing what is more fundamental (155–156).
Only under a certain interpretation is one proposition more fundamen-
tal than another, for instance—a fact that Quine would employ later to 
radical effect.15 One fascinating question in the scholarship of logicism 
is whether Frege, or Russell, can allow for differing interpretations or 
frameworks. Of course, one can be a logicist—even a Fregean—and can 
say that different frameworks can be considered hypothetically, on the 
way to discovering the final, true set of laws or fundamental proposi-
tions of a science.
Russell’s regressive method for discovering the axioms of mathemat-
ics should be read in the larger context of the method of analysis and 
of what I’ve called immanent logicism. Mathematicians may use axi-
oms, logical concepts, logical presuppositions, and the like implicitly. 
Discovering those axioms or presuppositions may require formulating 
premises that are much more complicated than the conclusions they 
support, which seems to be a direct contradiction of the logicist require-
ment that complex mathematical results should be derived from simpler 
logical laws and rules of inference.
But the regressive discovery of the axioms on which certain inferences 
or results depend is not, in and of itself, a Russellian analysis of the logi-
cal structures of dependence of a theory, or of the fundamental logical 
conditions for mathematical results. The regressive moment should be 
understood as a step along the way to delineating those structures of 
dependence. The method of analysis also requires resolving the proposi-
tions and theories at issue into their proper elements and identifying the 
interpretation or framework for the analysis of a given theory.
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Moreover, accepting an axiom as fundamental under a given frame-
work, as a regressive condition for recovering certain results of a theory, 
does not require accepting that axiom as true. It can be indispensable 
to a result, in Quine’s and Putnam’s later sense.16 But it does not have 
to be true under Frege’s definition. Nor does such an axiom, in the 
framework of Russell’s method, have to be a statement in a universal 
logical language.17 In that sense, Russell can avoid Sheffer’s logocentric 
predicament.
Why does Russell allow for this broader, conditional sense of logi-
cism? If logic is to be regarded as a “first science,” and as the language in 
which all other sciences are expressed, it must be possible to discover the 
logical relationships within scientific theories. If that is to be the case, 
then those theories, themselves, must be the evidence given for those 
relationships. Any logical explanation of a theoretical structure or rela-
tionship of dependence should recapture the result of the theory that is 
being explained. If the above statements do not obtain, then one under-
lying motivation for logicism is weakened: its status as “first science.”
Logicism, then, involves not just particular commitments about 
the derivability of statements or results from logic. It can be seen, as 
well, as a commitment to the claim that the structures and relations of 
dependence within theories are logical. The Russellian logicist believes 
that while puzzles, paradoxes, and problems may persist, they also may 
reveal an underlying relational structure that, if interpreted properly, 
extends our knowledge.18 The confidence that there is such a struc-
ture to be found is the basis of Russell’s immanent logicism, and of his 
employment of the method of analysis in logic and in mathematics.
Notes
 1. See Ricketts (1985) for a discussion of this distinction and 
Wittgenstein’s objection, that “the status Frege assigns to inference rules 
characterizes all of logic; as a consequence, there are, in Frege’s sense, 
no logical laws” (p. 4).
 2. Russell (1905b, 1906), see also Lakatos (1962/1980), 18 and passim.
 3. Or even “inductive,” though I will not explore this terminological sub-
tlety further.
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 4. Russell (1912), ch. 11; Russell (1924/1988), 163f. Christopher 
Pincock recognized the relevance of Problems to this discussion.
 5. Irving (1989), 314; the citation is from Russell (1959), 76.
 6. See Schabas (1990), ch. 4 for Herschel’s influence on Jevons.
 7. The principles thus achieved are “believed chiefly because of their con-
sequences” (Russell 1924/1988, 163). See Section 3 of Irvine (1989) 
for a fuller discussion of Russell’s claim.
 8. There are no notes in the copy preserved in the Bertrand Russell 
Archives, nor do the Archives possess notes made elsewhere. I am 
grateful to Nicholas Griffin for this information and also for pointing 
out that this does not mean such notes do not exist. As Christopher 
Pincock observed in correspondence, there are references to Jevons in 
volume 1 of Russell’s Collected Papers (1983), but these do not appear 
to be relevant to the current context (254, 356).
 9. Bradley discusses Jevons’s Principles extensively in The Principles of Logic, 
and writes in the conclusion to Book II, Part II, Ch. 4 that “no living 
Englishman has done half the service to logic that Professor Jevons has 
done … And there can not be anyone who has left unread the Principles 
of Science, who has not something to learn from it” (1883, 360). 
Bradley disagreed with Jevons’s methodology, and this remark is made 
after many pages of criticism. But the criticism and the praise both 
demonstrate that Bradley had engaged seriously with the text. Frege’s 
citation of Jevons is given below (Foundations 1884/1974, §16). Keynes 
discusses the Principles in Keynes (1921), 43 and especially 243ff.
 10. In comments on a draft, Greg Frost-Arnold pointed out that Russell 
and Jevons could have picked up these ideas from a common source. 
I now believe this to be true in some cases. My aim is not to prove a 
direct influence of one author on another, but rather that Russell was 
influenced by this renewed interest in regressive justification.
 11. This would be an influence, but an indirect one.
 12. Russell reviewed Science and Hypothesis twice for Mind (1905b, 1906), 
though somewhat unfavorably. He wrote a preface to the 1914 English 
edition of Science and Method.
 13. Russell discusses why he does not accept this in Russell (1922).
 14. Frege cites the second edition of Principles.
 15. Morris (2015) argues that Quine’s naturalism owes a debt to Russell’s 
“moves toward a scientific philosophy” (p. 151).
 16. Audrey Yap remarked on the relevance of Quine-Putnam indispensabil-
ity to this discussion.
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 17. See Korhonen (2012) for an extensive discussion of the relevance of 
this question for Frege and for Russell.
 18. “A logical theory may be tested by its capacity for dealing with puz-
zles, and it is a wholesome plan, in thinking about logic, to stock the 
mind with as many puzzles as possible, since these serve much the same 
purpose as is served by experiments in physical science” (Russell 1905a, 
484–485).
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